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Abstract
In her inaugural address on 25 February 2013, Korean President 
Park Geun-hye announced her vision to create a “Second Miracle 
on the Han River” through a new policy focus on developing a 
“creative economy.” Much as economic democratization was a 
leading theme of Korea’s 2012 presidential election, Park has 
seized on the concept of “creative economy” during her first 
months in office as the core of her administration’s economic 
growth agenda. Though previous Korean governments have 
taken steps to support Korea’s transition to an advanced 
innovation-driven economy, the Park administration has 
significantly heightened the level of priority of these efforts in 
order to foster the innovation and new engines of economic 
growth that will drive Korea’s future prosperity. The success of 
these policies requires a focus by Korean policy stakeholders, 
including government, businesses, researchers, and consumers, 
on addressing fundamental challenges within Korea’s innovation 
ecosystem. These include regulatory, structural, educational, 
and cultural obstacles that constrain Korea’s ability to fully foster 
and utilize its innovative capacities. Getting these fundamentals 
right will support Korea as it seeks to foster new industries that 
will drive its future growth and competitiveness. This requires a 
long-term commitment beyond President Park’s five-year term 
in office, but actions can be taken in the near term to build the 
foundation for future successes.
Key words: Innovation Policy, Creative Economy, Park Geun-hye, 
Regulatory Reform, Korean Economic Policy
Introduction
What exactly “creative economy” means, from a policy 
perspective in Korea, remains a topic of discussion.1 Korean 
President Park Geun-hye herself defined “creative economy” in 
her inauguration speech as the idea of creating new engines of 
growth and employment through “the convergence of science 
and technology with industry, the fusion of culture and industry, 
and the blossoming of creativity in the very borders that were 
once permeated by barriers.”2 This focus on new forms of 
convergence of information and communications technologies 
(ICT) with traditional industries, as well as culture and content, 
has been a recurring theme in her statements on the creative 
economy agenda. What is not ambiguous is the desired 
outcome: job creation. From the beginning, Park has articulated 
the creative economy agenda as a means to achieve the goal 
of economic democratization and creating new employment 
opportunities she pledged to pursue, including raising Korea’s 
employment rate to 70 percent.3 
This paper examines the Park administration’s creative economy 
agenda and its potential implications for Korea. It will first review 
concepts of innovation, and considerations for approaching 
innovation within public policies aimed at promoting economic 
growth. It will then examine the broader economic context in 
Korea in which the Park administration is pursuing these goals, 
and which shapes and constrains Korea’s innovation ecosystem. 
Following a review of some of the major actions and policy 
proposals introduced by the Korean government to implement 
the creative economy agenda thus far, it assesses these 
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proposals and suggests areas for the Korean government and 
other policy stakeholders to focus attention, in particular getting 
the fundamentals right and addressing regulatory, structural, 
and cultural barriers to innovation. 
The “Creative Economy” and Role of Innovation Policies
 The term “creative economy” is perhaps most appropriately seen 
in the case of Korea as a guiding theme for economic policies, 
much like “green growth” was during the previous Lee Myung-
bak administration. More significant is the Park administration’s 
decision to emphasize innovation front and center in Korea’s 
economic policy agenda, and its recognition of the importance 
of cultivating the most conducive ecosystem possible to foster 
the innovation needed to support Korea’s future growth. In 
examining the creative economy agenda, it is useful to consider 
ways in which innovation is defined and addressed more broadly 
within the context of public policy. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) has defined innovation as the “implementation of 
a new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
or process, a new marketing method, or a new organization 
method in business practices, workplace organization or 
external relations.”4 Innovation can also be described as a 
dynamic, interactive process encompassing a diverse range of 
interconnected areas, levels of society, and actors.5 These include 
research and development (R&D), education, and physical and 
regulatory infrastructure, along with intangible assets such as 
intellectual property (IP), organizational management, tacit 
knowledge of human capital, workforce training, marketing, and 
design. Framework policy and economic conditions that shape 
the innovation ecosystem include, but are not limited to, labor 
mobility, tax burdens and incentives, trade and investment, IP 
protections and enforcement, standards-setting processes, 
regulatory burdens, and societal attitudes. Key actors in 
innovation include government, researchers, the private sector—
ranging from entrepreneurial startup businesses and large firms 
conducting their own R&D to the scope of financial, legal, and 
other professionals whose services support these activities—and 
consumers, who ultimately determine which products, services, 
and business models succeed. 
Countries pursue innovation policies to increase growth, 
competitiveness, and jobs.6 The complex range of factors 
outlined above, coupled with the dynamic and disruptive 
nature of innovation, presents policymakers with the question 
of how to design and manage innovation policy instruments. 
The most effective role for governments to play in this process 
is increasingly viewed as shaping the framework conditions 
within which innovations emerge, and coordinating and 
facilitating among the broader networks of actors and policies 
described above, in order to foster the most conducive possible 
environment for innovation.7 This is an important distinction for 
a country such as Korea in which the government has at times 
taken a direct, hands-on role in shaping the economy.
Entrepreneurship is an increasing area of attention within 
innovation policies, and there is growing consensus about the 
important role of entrepreneurs as “carriers of innovation” in 
introducing innovative products, services, and business models. 
The Kauffman Foundation, citing U.S. government data, has 
estimated that entrepreneurial companies generated nearly all 
net job creation in the United States between 1980 and 2005.8 
Perhaps significant for Korea, recent research on Japan’s economy 
found that from 1996 to 2006, virtually all new jobs created in 
Japan were by new company or foreign invested businesses or 
new companies, rather than established Japanese companies.9 
The Park administration has placed strong emphasis within the 
creative economy agenda on encouraging entrepreneurship and 
startup businesses, though an important consideration for Korea 
is what kind of support is most appropriate, and conducive, for 
entrepreneurs and small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
The Creative Economy Agenda in Context:  
Measuring Korean Innovation Capabilities
Korea has successfully made the leap to becoming an advanced 
economy that today rates highly across several internationally 
recognized indicators and measures of innovation. For example, 
Korea is now the world’s fourth-largest source of triadic 
patents, an important indicator of the quality of its innovation 
capabilities. Korea’s gross domestic expenditure on R&D in 
2010 was equivalent to 3.7 percent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP), one of the highest levels among OECD member 
economies. Korea is a prolific source of ICT-related patents, 
and Korean companies including Samsung and LG Electronics 
are global leaders in this sector. Home to one of the world’s 
most networked societies in terms of ICT, Korea has one of the 
strongest internet infrastructures of any country. The ICT sector 
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represented 13.2 percent of total value added in Korea’s economy 
in 2009, and accounted for 6.2 percent of Korea’s business sector 
employment.10 Korean students consistently rank at or near the 
top of international math and science assessments, and Korea 
has among the highest level of university graduates among OECD 
member economies. 
These impressive statistics, at first glance, may seem to call 
into question the need for a “creative economy” policy agenda. 
However, a broader examination of Korea’s national innovation 
system shows some imbalances, which are illustrated in the 
graphs below:
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Structural Composition of BERD, 2009 or Latest Year Available
As a % of total BERD
Source: OECD, ANBERD Database, April 2012; OECD MSTI Database, June 2012; OECD, RDS Database, June 2012
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Revealed Technology Advantage in Selected Fields, 2007-09
Index based on PCT patent applications
Source: OECD, Patent Database, February 2012
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As shown in these figures, Korean R&D is heavily weighted 
towards applied research, rather than basic research. In 2009, 
71.1 percent of Korea’s R&D was funded by the private sector, 
primarily large companies, which also conducted 74.3 percent 
of Korea’s R&D.11 Eighty-eight percent of Korean R&D was in 
the manufacturing sector, 48 percent of which was in the single 
category of radio, television, and communication equipment. 
R&D activity by Korean public research institutions and 
universities, venues where basic research is traditionally w out, 
is comparatively weak: in 2009, Korean universities accounted 
for just 0.9 percent of R&D funding and conducted 11.1 percent 
of R&D. Because basic research is more likely to be conducted 
at universities and research institutes than by the private sector, 
this has important implications for Korea’s innovation trajectory 
as the country reaches the technology frontier.12
In addition, R&D conducted by Korean SMEs and in the services 
sector—both of which are important generators of innovative 
products and services—is comparatively low. It is worth noting 
that R&D expenditures by SMEs have increased significantly in 
recent years, growing five-fold from 12 percent to 24 percent of 
Korean firms’ total R&D expenditures in 2006, but still pale in 
comparison with those of large companies.13 
Also noteworthy is Korea’s relatively low levels of international 
collaboration on R&D.14 For example, in 2010, 26 percent of 
Korean science articles and 4 percent of Patent Cooperation 
Treaty (PCT) patent applications were produced with international 
co-authorship.15 Although a leader in ICT patents, Korea rates 
lower among OECD economies in patents for biotechnology, 
nanotechnology, and environmental technologies, sectors 
Korean policymakers and industries have targeted as future 
growth engines.16 
These indicators reflect some of the broader challenges facing 
Korea as it seeks to foster new innovation-driven economic 
growth. The emphasis on applied research, comparatively low 
levels of R&D conducted by Korean universities, SMEs, and the 
services sector, and low levels of international collaboration, 
reflects the nature of much of Korea’s R&D being conducted 
in-house by large company conglomerates (chaebol).17 During 
Korea’s period of rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s, 
when the Korean government focused on rapid export-led 
growth through developing heavy industry through the chaebol, 
SMEs and the services sector were neglected. While chaebol 
dominate the Korean economy today, SMEs account for 99 
percent of Korean businesses and nearly 90 percent of private 
sector employment, and services comprise more than 60 percent 
of Korea’s GDP.
SME growth and development has been limited in part by the 
relatively closed nature of Korea’s vertically-integrated corporate 
structure, in which chaebol rely on in-house knowledge and 
resources, and conduct trade and business within conglomerate 
families, with fewer propensities for new competitor entry, spin-
off businesses, and open innovation.18 In these arrangements, 
compounded by lack of competition and enforcement of 
competition rules,19 SMEs have served mostly as suppliers and 
subcontractors for large companies, rather than as resources 
and partners for innovation, and their ability to develop their 
own innovative capabilities have been limited. The resulting 
distortions of this economic structure were recognized by Korean 
government officials and analysts by the 1980s,20 but successive 
efforts to create a support infrastructure for SMEs to bolster 
R&D activities failed to bridge these gaps.21 Over time disparities 
have increased. SMEs are estimated to have only 35 percent 
of the productivity of large Korean companies—27 percent of 
the productivity in the case of manufacturing firms—and only 
0.07 percent of small companies grow into large companies.22 
SME wages are about 62 percent of those of large companies, 
and service sector wages are 55 percent of those in Korea’s 
manufacturing sector.23 Additionally, government support 
programs for SMEs can create disincentives for SMEs to grow,24 
“In these arrangements, 
compounded by lack of 
competition and enforcement 
of competition rules, SMEs 
have served mostly as 
suppliers and subcontractors 
for large companies, rather 
than as resources and partners 
for innovation, and their 
ability to develop their own 
innovative capabilities have 
been limited.”
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and government bailouts of SMEs in the wake of the 1997-1998 
and 2008 financial crises may have exacerbated these challenges 
by increasing SME reliance on public funds.25 
Indicators also point to relative weaknesses of Korea’s universities 
in R&D, which reflect some challenges within Korea’s education 
system. Korean experts have long urged improvements in the 
quality of education, urging less focus on rote learning and more 
on creativity and research, and have pointed to the emphasis in 
universities on teaching rather than research as a “bottleneck” 
for technology learning.26 They have also cautioned the explosive 
growth of the private education industry, driven in part by the 
extreme competitiveness among students to pass admissions 
tests for Korea’s most elite universities that are seen as guarantees 
for high-prestige employment with large corporations and the 
government. One consequence is that Koreans pay more for 
education than their counterparts in just about every other 
OECD nation.27 At the same time, unemployment levels for 
university graduates have escalated while jobs with chaebol have 
become increasingly competitive, and SMEs—which lack the 
prestige, salaries, and benefits enjoyed by employees of large 
companies—face challenges filling jobs. Forty-three percent 
of SMEs responded in a 2011 Korean government survey that 
they face or expected to face a labor shortage, in part due to a 
lack of qualified applicants, low salaries and benefits, and high 
expectations of job applicants.28
For a country whose entrepreneurs of the 1950s and 1960s 
built the chaebol of today, Korea is perceived as a challenging 
country for entrepreneurship. People in Korea speak of 
considerable family and societal pressure on young people to 
pursue stable careers in government or large companies, versus 
small businesses or starting their own companies.29 In 2012 
the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM), which conducts 
the world’s largest survey on entrepreneurship, found that 59 
percent of Korean respondents viewed entrepreneurship as a 
good career choice, and 70 percent agreed that entrepreneurs 
in Korea received a high social status. However, the survey found 
comparatively negative views among Korean respondents of 
perceived opportunities, including starting a business where 
they live (13 percent), having the necessary skills and knowledge 
to start a business (27 percent), and a relatively high fear of 
failure (43 percent).30 A recent survey conducted by the Hyundai 
Research Institute found starkly more negative views: more than 
80 percent of respondents saw conditions for starting a new 
business in Korea as negative, and respondents in the 20-30 
year age range were even less interested in pursuing a high-tech 
startup than older people were. The survey also found that 92 
percent of respondents worried about a failed startup enterprise 
resulting in debt delinquency or a poor credit rating, and three-
quarters said that Korea is a difficult place to recover from 
bankruptcy—reflecting an important barrier to entrepreneurship 
and risk taking.31 The relatively negative outlook towards risk-
taking and entrepreneurship reflects a range of cultural and 
structural factors that shape and constrain Korea’s environment 
for innovation. 
These aspects of Korea’s national innovation system and 
economic structure have become more pressing challenges 
as Korea has reached the limits of its previous economic 
development approach predicated on catching up with other 
advanced economies. Korea’s potential growth rate per capita, 
which slowed from about 7 percent in 1995 to a present level near 
4 percent, is projected to further decrease to almost 2 percent 
during the 2030s. This decline reflects a decrease in productivity 
and labor inputs. Important contributing factors include Korea’s 
inflexible labor market, which reduces employment mobility and 
has created an increasingly dualistic system of regular employees 
and non-regular workers lacking the same levels of salaries, 
benefits, protections, and training opportunities. Korea has one 
of the world’s lowest fertility rates, coupled with low levels of 
women in the workforce. Wage growth has failed to keep up 
with GDP growth, contributing to rising economic inequalities, 
and addressing these challenges is an important priority for 
Korea to regain growth momentum.32
The Creative Economy Policy Agenda
The above challenges have long been recognized by Korean 
policymakers, and Park is not the first Korean president to talk 
about the importance of innovation or introduce initiatives 
to enhance Korea’s science, technology, and innovation 
capabilities to support new growth. What distinguishes the Park 
administration from its predecessors is its heavy emphasis on 
innovation, in the form of the “creative economy” concept, as 
the centerpiece of its economic policy agenda.
During Park’s first months in office, the Korean government 
has moved swiftly to develop and implement this agenda, 
including through three broad policy actions. These include, 
Building a Creative Economy in South Korea: Analyzing the Plans and  
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first, the establishment of a new Ministry of Science, ICT and 
Future Planning (MSIP), which was created by combining three 
previously separate government agencies and tasked with 
leading the development, coordination, and implementation of 
creative economy policies within the Korean government. MSIP’s 
policy objectives include creating an ecosystem conducive 
to facilitating startups, including through strengthening 
IP protections; strengthening Korea’s R&D and innovation 
capabilities; making software and content core industries of 
the Korean economy; promoting international cooperation 
and globalization of Korean businesses and technologies; and 
developing science, technology, and ICT to support social needs 
and improve people’s livelihoods.33 
MSIP’s objectives reflect the “creative economy action plan” 
introduced by the Korean government on 4 June 2013, the second 
major action by the Park administration to advance the creative 
economy agenda. This plan targets creating new employment 
and industries based on creativity and innovation; strengthening 
Korea’s global innovation leadership; and establishing a society 
“where creativity is respected and manifested.” The plan 
incorporates six strategies to achieve these goals: establishing an 
ecosystem that promotes the creation of startups; strengthening 
the role of startups and SMEs within Korea’s economy and 
enhancing their ability to enter global markets; generating new 
industries as growth engines; fostering world-class creative 
talent; strengthening Korea’s science, technology, and ICT to 
increase innovation capabilities; and promoting a creative 
economic culture within Korean society. 34
The creative economy action plan incorporates a set of “Measures 
to Develop a Venture-Startup Funding Ecosystem” announced 
by the Korean government on 15 May 2013 that focus on 
eliminating financial and regulatory barriers to entrepreneurs 
and SMEs. These target the goal of creating a “free-flowing 
virtuous cycle of enterprise creation, growth, investment 
withdrawal, and reinvestment” along the lines of Silicon Valley’s 
venture ecosystem, including by improving the environment for 
financing and increasing the availability of investment capital 
available to entrepreneurs. Specific proposals to achieve this 
include tax incentives and deregulation to stimulate angel 
investment and reinvestment by successful entrepreneurs in 
new startups; establishing new funds to support startups and 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As); introducing a crowdfunding 
scheme; and regulatory reforms to remove barriers to M&As 
related to technology. The proposals also include incentives for 
Koreans working overseas to invest in and provide mentorship to 
domestic entrepreneurs, and creating an “entrepreneur visa” to 
encourage highly-skilled foreigners to start businesses in Korea. 35 
Other tasks outlined in the creative economy blueprint tackle 
several issues long identified as challenges to Korea’s innovation 
environment and broader economy. For example, to boost 
Korea’s innovation capabilities, the plan calls for increasing 
funding for basic research by 40 percent by 2017, along with 
improving the relatively weak linkages between universities, 
research labs, industry, and government, and support for 
researchers to commercialize innovative technologies. It pledges 
improvements in the infrastructure for generating, protecting, 
and using IP. To bolster the content and services industries, it 
targets improving industry productivity through ICT and software 
convergence and strengthening the software sector, including 
through measures to develop cloud computing, promote big 
data analysis and utilization, and expand education and training 
of Internet security professionals. The plan calls for increasing 
government procurement opportunities for new convergence 
technologies, reflecting the important role government 
procurement can play in bringing innovations to market, and 
localization support to startups with promising products to 
enter global markets. In education, it calls among other things 
for extracurricular activities to expose students to successful 
entrepreneurs and startup competitions in order to build their 
interest in entrepreneurship opportunities.
In tandem with these plans, the Korean government announced 
on 12 June 2013 a set of measures intended to enhance the 
productivity of SMEs more broadly.36 These include initiatives to 
strengthen SME technology development capabilities, enhance 
their ability to train and retain skilled workers, and expand 
markets including through successful commercialization of new 
technologies. They aim to increase synergies between SMEs 
and large companies, and to improve the support infrastructure 
available for SMEs including through more effective collaboration 
among government agencies to monitor policy efficacy and 
eliminate burdensome regulations. As part of these measures, 
the Korean government pledged to increase public funding for 
technology development by SMEs to 18 percent of the national 
R&D budget by 2017, and to prioritize SMEs in transferring publicly-
funded technologies from universities and institutes. To address 
chronic SME labor shortages, the plan includes scholarships for 
university students that commit to SME employment.
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
9Building a Creative Economy in South Korea: Analyzing the Plans and  Possibilities for New Economic Growth
A third set of actions by President Park and her government 
has been active public outreach efforts to promote the creative 
economy agenda, and to champion the value of innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Park and senior government officials have 
made frequent site visits to promising Korean startups, and have 
held highly-publicized meetings with internationally renowned 
entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates, Larry Page of Google, and Mark 
Zuckerberg of Facebook to seek their ideas for actions Korea 
should take to foster the creative economy. 
The Creative Economy Agenda in Historical Perspective
Several aspects of the creative economy policy proposals have 
precedents in Korea. For example, in 1997 the Korean government 
enacted the Special Law on Science and Technology Innovation, 
with the goal of improving Korea’s science and technology 
capabilities to the level of advanced economies. A related five-
year plan that entered into effect in 1998 called for increasing 
the R&D budget to 5 percent of the total government budget 
by 2002, improving science and technology policy coordination, 
and increasing investment in basic research. It also included 
provisions to increase technology promotion funding, expand 
technology assistance programs for SMEs, introduce financing 
options allowing the use of technology and IP as collateral, 
and strengthen tax incentives for R&D and human resource 
development. At the time these laws were enacted, observers 
commented that they did not go far enough to address challenges 
with Korea’s national innovation system, including removing 
institutional barriers and silo tendencies between institutions, 
which limit the diffusion of innovation and interactive learning; 
limited labor mobility; limited incentives to increase university-
industry collaboration; and stricter protections for IP—criticisms 
that still echo today.37 
Economic and other reforms implemented by the Kim Dae-jung 
administration following the 1997-1998 financial crisis included 
emphasis on boosting Korea’s science and technology capabilities 
and R&D activities, and provided significant financial support for 
startup businesses. At a time when chaebol were restructuring 
and downsizing, Korea experienced a boom of high-tech startups, 
which grew from 100 to 5,000 companies just within 1999, but 
which collapsed in tandem with the U.S. dot-com crash.38 The Park 
administration has pointed to a heavy reliance on loans as the 
primary form of government financial support for these startups 
as a contributing factor to their failure, which underlies its policy 
focus on improving the overall environment for investment in 
startup firms so that they do not need to be as reliant on loans. 
The Kim Dae-jung administration also established the Ministry of 
Science and Technology as a separate entity, though it lacked the 
power to effectively coordinate science and technology policies 
across other government ministries.39 The Roh Moo-hyun and 
Lee Myung-bak administrations also emphasized the need to 
upgrade Korea’s science, research and education capabilities and 
made similar efforts to increase R&D funding and enhance policy 
coordination within the government on science, technology, 
and innovation.40
Assessing the Creative Economy Agenda
Park has described the creative economy agenda as a “paradigm 
shift” for Korea. The ultimate success of these policies requires 
such a shift, for it will involve changing the ways in which the 
Korean government and broader public measure and perceive 
success, and the steps for getting there. The desired outcomes of 
the creative economy agenda are long term in nature, for which 
a commitment and time horizon beyond Park’s five-year term 
as president are essential. To succeed, they will also necessitate 
tackling reforms that will be politically sensitive. Pragmatism 
and flexibility are required, for many successful examples 
of the “creative economy” that Park and her administration 
have highlighted were not preordained. Ensuring an enabling 
environment for innovation that does not hold back unanticipated 
surprises, even if they do not align with government or other 
expectations, is important. 
Although implementation of the creative economy agenda is still 
at an initial stage and it is too early to assess its performance, 
below are three areas where leadership by the Park administration 
will be valuable in building momentum for this initiative and in 
enhancing Korea’s environment for innovation. 
Regulatory Reform and Getting the Fundamentals Right: It is 
important that the Korean government not lose focus on creating 
the most conducive environment possible for innovation. 
Regulatory, tax, labor mobility, and other reforms that will 
encourage businesses both small and large to enhance their 
innovative activities and capabilities, improve their productivity, 
and create new jobs will be beneficial.41 As it proceeds with 
implementing its policy initiatives, it is important for the Park 
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administration to recognize the limitations of the government’s 
role and ability to shape the creative economy, and avoid market 
interventions that could inhibit Korea’s economy to meet the 
challenge of rapidly changing technologies.42 John Howkins, who 
is credited with coining the term “creative economy,” has pointed 
out that governments “cannot enforce creativity.”43 
Park and her administration have stated that deregulation is the 
key to fostering the entrepreneurship that will drive the creative 
economy, and they have pledged to eliminate unnecessary 
regulations. At the same time, more than 500 regulatory measures 
have reportedly been introduced by the Park administration since 
taking office, after increasing significantly during the previous 
four years.44 It is important for the Park administration not only 
to identify and eliminate regulations that constrain the broader 
innovation framework, but also be mindful of their potential to 
do so. One example of such kind of unexpected consequences 
are long-standing Korean cyber security laws mandating use of 
the ActiveX security software, which over time and in practice 
has constrained Korean consumers’ ability to make online 
payments by de facto limiting them only to use of Microsoft’s 
Internet Explorer web browser.45 Additionally, proposed cloud 
computing legislation under discussion in Korea has generated 
concern within the global IT industry as attempts to regulate the 
cloud that could create new market barriers for both Korean and 
global cloud services providers.46 
Park’s creation of MSIP is a well-intended effort to increase policy 
coordination within the Korean government and overcome 
bureaucratic silos. However, it represents the third major 
reorganization of the Korean government’s science, technology 
and innovation governance system within the past decade. These 
frequent changes, coupled with public expectations for quick 
outcomes, present the risk of adverse effects resulting from lack 
of continuity and merging together different institutions and 
their respective organizational cultures.47 
The Park administration’s focus on supporting SMEs and 
entrepreneurs and boosting the services sector, both in 
facilitating new opportunities and by strengthening IP and other 
protections, addresses important components of Korea’s national 
innovation system that have not achieved their full growth 
potential. Implementing these provisions should be coupled 
with broader actions beyond the creative economy agenda 
to foster a more level playing field for SMEs in the domestic 
market. These include tackling unfair business practices, but also 
eliminating disincentives for SMEs to grow and by ensuring they 
do not become dependent on public funding. Chaebol have a 
vital role to play in advancing the creative economy agenda, and 
deregulation and incentives that enable them to expand their 
R&D activities are important. The Park administration has pushed 
chaebol to explore “win-win” opportunities to partner with 
SMEs in bringing innovative technologies to market, including as 
part of its economic democratization goals to reduce the gaps 
between large and small companies. Some large companies 
have announced plans to partner with and open new business 
opportunities for SMEs,48 and moving forward it will be useful 
to monitor successful incentives and cases that could present 
models for best and effective practices. 
Fear of failure represents a significant constraint to 
entrepreneurship in Korea, and the creative economy agenda. 
The Park administration has taken an early focus and emphasis 
in its plans to tackle this, particularly in regards to financing 
for SMEs and entrepreneurs. However, it is also important to 
consider other regulatory, legal, and institutional factors that 
increase the cost of failure and contribute to the risk aversion 
beyond cultural attitudes. For example, Korea’s strict bankruptcy 
laws have been identified as a challenge,49 and changing these 
laws in ways that would encourage more entrepreneurs to try 
launching a new business could be beneficial. Studies on the 
effects of reforms to Japan’s bankruptcy laws in the 1990s found 
an uptick in entrepreneurial behavior in the following years.50 
Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Global Markets: The 
Park administration has discussed within the creative economy 
agenda supporting promising Korean startups entering global 
networks, attracting funding and mentorship from overseas 
Koreans, and offering an entrepreneurship visa to attract foreign 
entrepreneurs to set up business in Korea. However, somewhat 
missing from the Park administration’s creative economy 
discourse has been trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
the important role these can play in facilitating innovation, both 
through introducing new knowledge and technology spillovers 
and generating increased market competition.
Korea’s free trade agreements with the United States and 
European Union represent important opportunities to advance 
the creative economy agenda in this regard.51 Full implementation 
of these agreements and the regulatory reforms they incorporate 
will benefit Korean businesses by reducing burdens, fostering a 
more competitive market, and bringing Korea in closer alignment 
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with global standards. The agreements provide Korean SMEs and 
entrepreneurial startups new opportunities to introduce their 
innovative products and services in these important international 
markets. They also open the door to new FDI that could help foster 
the new creative industries sought by the Park administration. 
Several elements of these agreements, including eliminating 
barriers to market entry and FDI, increased transparency, and 
enhanced competition policies, among others, have been 
identified as keys for strengthening Korea’s underperforming 
services sector.52 The Korean government should be looking how 
most effectively to leverage these agreements, along with other 
trade agreements Korea is currently negotiating or may join in the 
future, to create synergies with its creative economy initiatives 
and help innovative Korean businesses enter global markets.
Communicating the Importance of Innovation: The Park 
administration has an important role to play in building 
public consensus around the creative economy agenda, 
including through communicating the value of innovation 
and entrepreneurship. It will need to clearly articulate how 
related policy actions and reforms, including some that may be 
politically sensitive, will advance the creative economy agenda, 
as well as manage public expectations about outcomes that 
could take years to manifest. While it is prudent not to define 
“creative economy” in the public consciousness as narrowly as 
the Park administration has sometimes risked doing with its 
emphasis on ICT convergence, overuse of the term for unrelated 
and counterintuitive projects could risk generating public 
perceptions of the term as an empty slogan.
Because many barriers to innovation in Korea are cultural in 
nature, the education sector should be a primary area of focus 
of the creative economy agenda. Efforts to overcome these 
constraints, create more tolerance for failure, and broaden 
perceptions and public definitions of what success means, 
would benefit through infusing these principles in to the 
education system early. Groups like the Korea Entrepreneurship 
Foundation are taking an active role in Korea to encourage 
this. To support change, sustained and consistent messaging 
from the president and other senior government and business 
leaders will be paramount.
Conclusion
The Park administration’s creative economy agenda represents 
an important and needed effort by the Korean government 
to build the foundation for Korea’s future sustained growth 
and prosperity. It additionally presents new approaches and 
opportunities to tackle pressing social and demographic 
challenges increasingly confronting Korea. Moving forward, it is 
important that the Park administration not lose focus of its goal 
of ensuring the best potential ecosystem in Korea for innovation, 
entrepreneurship, and fostering creative new industries. 
Addressing regulatory, structural, and cultural barriers require a 
long-term approach and commitment, and may not yield short-
term results. This will require patience in implementing this 
agenda, and in demonstrating and communicating to the broader 
Korean public positive outcomes and new ways of measuring 
success more appropriate to Korea’s future growth trajectory. 
While this would be challenging for any government, Korea has 
demonstrated time and time again a remarkable capability and 
dynamism to adapt to new paradigms, and the creative economy 
agenda will hopefully be no exception.
Building a Creative Economy in South Korea: Analyzing the Plans and  
Possibilities for New Economic Growth
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
12
Endnotes
1 The comment “nobody knows what (creative economy) means” came up often in the author’s conversations during visits to Seoul, Korea in 2013. 
2 Park Geun-hye, “Opening a New Era of Hope (The 18th Presidential Inaugural Address)” (speech, Seoul, Korea, February 25, 2013), Office of the President 
(Republic of Korea), accessed 4 December, 2013, http://english.president.go.kr/pre_activity/speeches/speeches_view2.php?uno=7783&board_no=E12&search_
key=&search_value=&search_cate_code=&cur_page_no=2.
3 “Seoul Unveils Plans for Growth, Job Creation through ‘Creative Economy,’” Yonhap News, 5 June 2013, accessed 9 September 2013, http://english.yonhapnews.
co.kr/business/2013/06/04/51/0502000000AEN20130604002751320F.HTML.
4 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), “Ministerial Report on the OECD Innovation Strategy. Innovation to Strengthen Growth and 
Address Global and Social Challenges. Key Findings” (Paris: OECD Publishing, May 2010), accessed 20 June 2012, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/51/28/45326349.
pdf, 1. 
5 Smits, Ruud, Stefan Kuhlmann, and Morris Teubal, “A System-Evolutionary Approach for Innovation Policy,” in Ruud E. Smits, et al, eds., The Theory and Practice of 
Innovation Policy. An International Research Handbook (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2011), 417, 429-430.
6 Ernst, Dieter, “Europe’s Innovation-Union – Beyond Technonationalism,” East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, 132, August 2012, accessed 23 
November 2013, http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/econwp132.pdf, 2. 
7 Robert D. Atkinson, Stephen J. Ezell, and Luke A. Stewart, The Global Innovation Policy Index, March 2012 (Washington, DC: Information Technology and Innovation 
Foundation and Kauffman Foundation, 2012), 9-18.
8 Kauffman Foundation, “Kauffman Foundation-Funded U.S. Census Bureau Data Highlight Importance of Business Startups to Job Creation in the U.S.,” 14 January 
2009, accessed 3 August 2012, http://www.kauffman.org/newsroom/business-dynamic-statistics.aspx.
9 American Chamber of Commerce in Japan (ACCJ), Charting a New Course for Growth: Recommendations for Japan’s Leaders, (Tokyo: ACCJ, 2010), 10-22.
10 OECD, “Korea,” in Science, Technology and Industry Outlook 2012 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2012), accessed 8 October 2013, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-
Management/oecd/science-and-technology/oecd-science-technology-and-industry-outlook-2012/korea_sti_outlook-2012-59-en#page1, 336-339. 
11 Jones, R.S., and S. Urasawa, “Sustaining Korea’s Convergence to the Highest Income Countries.” OECD Economic Department Working Papers, 965 (Paris, OECD 
Publishing), 2012, http://dx.doi.org/10.178715k97gkd8jgzs-en, accessed 20 March 2013, 36.
12 Jones, 36. 
13 Michael Keenan, “Moving to the Innovation Frontier: Lessons from the OECD Review of Korean Innovation Policy,” in Korean Science and Technology in an 
International Perspective, J. Mahlich and W. Pascha, eds. (Berlin: Spring-Verlag, 2012), 22.
14 Ki-Seok Kwon, Han Woo Park, Minho So, Loet Leydesdorff, “Has globalization strengthened South Korea’s national research system? National and international 
dynamics of the Triple Helix of scientific co-authorship relationships in South Korea,” Scientometrics (2012), 90, 163-176.
15 OECD, “Korea,” 338.
16 OECD, “Korea,” 336-339. 
17 Linsu Kim, Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea’s Technological Learning, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1997), 64.
18 Marcus Noland, “Korea’s Growth Performance: Past and Future,” East-West Center Working Papers, Economics Series, 123, November 2011, 21.
19 Wonsik Choi, et al, Beyond Korean Style: Shaping a new growth formula, McKinsey Global Institute, April 2013, accessed 6 December 2013, http://www.mckinsey.
com/insights/asia-pacific/beyond_korean_style, 34.
20 Kim, Imitation to Innovation, 171, 189, 197.
21 Linsu Kim, “Crisis, Reform, and National Innovation in Korea,” in Crisis and Innovation in Asian Technology, William W. Keller and Richard J. Samuels, eds. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 104.
22 McKinsey, Beyond Korean Style, 35-36.
23 McKinsey, Beyond Korean Style, 22.
24 McKinsey, Beyond Korean Style, 36; Noland, 21.
25 Jones, 40.
26 Kim, Imitation to Innovation, 64; also, Kim, “Crisis,” 102.
27 David McNeill, “After Decades of Building Colleges, South Korea Faces a Lack of Students,” Chronicle of Higher Education 58, no. 15 (2 December 2011), A14.
28 Jones, 21.
29 “What do you do when you reach the top?” Economist, 12 November 2011, accessed 23 April 2013, http://www.economist.com/node/21538104/print. This topic 
also came up in several conversations during author’s visits to Seoul, Korea in April and May 2013. 
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
13Building a Creative Economy in South Korea: Analyzing the Plans and  Possibilities for New Economic Growth
30 Siri Roland Xavier, et al, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2012 GEM Report (Babson Park, MA: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, 2013), accessed 8 October 2013, 
http://www.gemconsortium.org/docs/2645/gem-2012-global-report, 20.
31 Kwaak, Jeyup S. “Fear of Financial Ruin Holds Back Korean Startups.” Wall Street Journal, 25 October 2013, accessed 31 October 2013, http://blogs.wsj.com/
korearealtime/2013/10/25/fear-of-financial-ruin-holds-back-korean-startups/.
32 OECD, “Strengthening Social Cohesion in Korea: Assessment and Recommendations (Preliminary Version),” (Paris: OECD Publishing, February 2013), accessed 20 
March 2013, http://www.oecd.org/els/Korea_AR_2401 For OPS.pdf, 1-8. Also McKinsey, Beyond Korean Style, 22-23.
33 http://english.msip.go.kr/english/wpge/m_57/eng02.do.
34 “The Park Geun-Hye Administration’s Creative Economy Blueprint, ‘Creative Economy Action Plan and Measures to Establish a Creative Economic 
Ecosystem’,” Ministry of Strategy and Finance (MOSF), Republic of Korea, press release, accessed 30 September 2013, http://english.mosf.go.kr/pre/view.
do?bcd=N0001&seq=3289&bPage=6. 
35 “Measures to Develop a Venture-Startup Funding Ecosystem,” MOSF press release, 15 May 2013, accessed 30 September 2013, http://english.mosf.go.kr/pre/view.
do?bcd=N0001&seq=3267&bPage=1.
36 “Measures for Productivity Enhancement of SMEs to Build a ‘Creative Economy’,” MOSF press release, 12 June 2013, accessed 30 September 2013, http://english.
mosf.go.kr/pre/view.do?bcd=N0001&seq=3300&bPage=6.
37 Lee Won-Young, “The Role of Science and Technology Policy in Korea’s Industrial Development,” in Technology, Learning and Innovation: Experiences of Newly 
Industrializing Economies, Linsu Kim and Richard R. Nelson, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 284-287.
38 Kim, “Crisis,” 94, 101.
39 Kim, “Crisis,” 91.
40 Margot Schüller, Marcus Conlé and David Shim, “Korean Innovation Governance Under Lee Myung-Bak – A Critical Analysis of Governmental Actors’ New Division 
of Labor, ” in Korean Science and Technology in an International Perspective, J. Mahlich and W. Pascha, eds. (Berlin: Spring-Verlag, 2012), 118-121.
41 DoHoon Kim and Youngsun Koh, “Korea’s Industrial Development,” in The Korean Economy. Six Decades of Growth and Development, SaKong Il and Youngsun Koh, 
eds. (Seoul, Korea Development Institute), 86, 93, 96.
42 Kim, 195-196
43 Lee Joo-hee, “Creative economy guru urges caution,” Korea Herald, 15 May 2013, accessed 15 May 2013, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20130515000832
44 “Entrepeneurial Spirit,” (Editorial), Korea Herald, 30 October 2013, accessed 23 November 2013, http://m.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20131030000647&ntn=0.
45 Harlan, Chico, “South Korea is Stuck with Internet Explorer for Online Shopping Because of Security Law,” Washington Post, 4 November 2013, accessed 
23 November 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/due-to-security-law-south-korea-is-stuck-with-internet-explorer-for-online-
shopping/2013/11/03/ffd2528a-3eff-11e3-b028-de922d7a3f47_story.html.
46 Information Technology Industry Council, “ITI Comments on Korea’s “Proposed Bill for the Development of Cloud Computing and Protection of Users”,” 3 July 2013, 
accessed 4 December 2013, http://www.itic.org/dotAsset/928ebb6f-d345-4085-a5d5-390b7c7bb3a9.pdf.
47 Schüller, Conlé and Shim, “Korean Innovation Governance,” 126.
48 For example, see Ji-hyun Kim, “LG opens W400b market to SMEs,” Korea Herald, 20 May 2013, accessed 6 December 2013, http://www.koreaherald.com/view.
php?ud=20130520000828.
49 Noland, 21.
50 Robert N. Eberhart, Charles E. Eesley, and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, “Failure is an Option: Failure Barriers and New Firm Performance,” Draft Working Paper and 
Preliminary Results (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, 2012), accessed 25 June 2012, http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/23422/Failure_is_an_Option_11.4.pdf, 2, 21.
51 This topic will be explored in more detail in in a forthcoming paper by the author, “Creating Korea’s Future Economy: Innovation, Growth and Korea-U.S. Economic 
Relations,” East-West Center, forthcoming.
52 Jones, 38-39.
ACADEMIC PAPER SERIES
14
KEI Editorial Board
KEI Editor: Nicholas Hamisevicz | Contract Editor: Gimga Group | Design: Gimga Group
The Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI) is a not-for-profit policy and educational outreach organization focused on promoting 
dialogue and understanding between the United States and Korea. Established in 1982, KEI covers all aspects of the alliance, including 
economic, trade, national security, and broader regional issues through publications, forums and conferences across North America. KEI is 
an affiliate with the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, a public research institute in the Republic of Korea.
The views expressed in this publication are those of the authors. While this paper is part of the overall program of the Korea Economic 
Institute of America endorsed by its Officers, Board of Directors, and Advisory Council, its contents do not necessarily reflect the views of 
individual members of the Board or of the Advisory Council.
Copyright © 2013 Korea Economic Institute of America     Printed in the United States of America.
1800 K St. NW, Suite 1010 | Washington, DC 20006  
T.202.464.1982 | F.202.464.1987 | www.keia.org
